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We study markets in which consumers prefer green products but cannot determine the envi-
ronmental quality of any given firm’s product on their own. A nongovernmental organization
(NGO) can establish a voluntary standard and label products that comply with it. Alternatively,
industry can create its own standard and label. We compare the stringency of these two types of
labels, and study their strategic interaction when they coexist. We find that even with error-free
labels, environmental benefits may be smaller with two labels than with the NGO label alone,
and we characterize when label competition is more likely to be environmentally beneficial.
1. Introduction
Global environmental issues such as biodiversity and climate change are increasingly im-
portant to citizens around the world, yet extremely difficult for governments to address
with standard policy tools. The globalization of trade and the need for international
coordination on global issues make harmonized world standards for environmental
problems unlikely anytime soon. Global trade law also makes it difficult for govern-
ments to attempt to regulate attributes of production processes outside their borders, as
opposed to inherent product attributes.
In the absence of environmental standards for production behavior, many groups
have put increasing effort into international market mechanisms such as ecolabeling. In
some cases, industry takes the lead in developing labels, for example, Starkist’s move
to dolphin-safe tuna (Reinhardt, 2000, pp. 31–34) or the pulp and paper industry’s
“Totally Chlorine Free” label (US EPA 1998, p. B115). In other cases, nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) sponsor labels, such as the “Good Environmental Choice” label
created by the Swedish Society for the Conservation of Nature (US EPA 1998, p. B99), or
the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) label, which was created by a coalition of groups.
More recently, there has been a growing proliferation of labels, as multiple groups enter
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the labeling marketplace.1 Of particular interest are situations in which industry has
responded to an NGO label with its own certification standards that employ alternative
criteria, which are typically less stringent than those used by the NGO. For example,
a coalition of industry groups has attacked the well-known Leadership in Energy and
Environmental Design (LEED) standard created by the nonprofit US Green Buildings
Council because it restricts the use of certain plastics and forest products; the coalition
instead promotes the weaker Green Globes standard (Makower, 2012).
A vivid example of label competition comes from the forest products sector. As
recounted by Sasser et al. (2006), the FSC was initiated in 1993 by a coalition of NGOs,
including Greenpeace and the World Wildlife Fund, which were disappointed when
nations failed to sign a global forest convention at the Rio Earth Summit. The Sustain-
able Forestry Initiative (SFI), in turn, was created a year later by the American Forest
and Paper Association (AF&PA) as an alternative that gave industry members greater
flexibility than the FSC system. Angered by the emergence of the SFI, NGOs supportive
of FSC have continually blasted the SFI alternative as a sham. In fact, on May 20, 2005,
a group of NGOs took out a full-page ad in the New York Times that said:
“How can you trust the timber industry to measure its own environmental
sustainability? Isn’t that like the fox guarding the henhouse? Simply stated,
the Sustainable Forestry Initiative program is a historic greenwashing effort
to blur the public’s trust in ecolabeling, helping loggers appear “sustainable”
when it’s really just the Same-old Forest Industry.”
The emergence of label competition is not surprising. As Bernstein and Cashore
(2007) point out, the initiators of a labeling regime face a dilemma: strict standards can
only be met by a small fraction of firms in an industry, whereas standards achievable
by most mainstream firms may be too loose to produce much overall environmental
improvement. Whether the first label takes a stringent or a lax approach, there is room
for a rival to enter and pursue the alternative strategy. Today, about 13% of the world’s
productive forests are certified, with 143 million hectares certified worldwide via FSC
and 232 million hectares certified by SFI and other labels under the umbrella of the Pro-
gramme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification (Cashore and Auld 2012). Whether
such label competition is actually good for the environment, however, is unclear.
There exists a substantial theoretical literature on ecolabels, which addresses sev-
eral sets of issues.2 One strand of the literature emphasizes how firms respond to a
labeling regime, building on the industrial organization literature on duopolistic ver-
tical differentiation. For example, Amacher et al. (2004) extend this literature to allow
a first stage in which firms can invest in a green technology; they find that environ-
mental performance is enhanced when the high- and low-quality firms have similar
cost structures. In a similar setup, Ibanez and Grolleau (2008) allow for a “brown” firm
1. Steering Committee of the State-of-Knowledge Assessment of Standards and Certification (2012) offers
a thorough analysis of the global impact of ecolabels. The web site www.ecolabelindex.com provides an up-to-
date overview of the labels currently in existence, and as of this writing tracks 410 different ecolabels around
the world.
2. There is also a literature on for-profit certification intermediaries, which includes such papers as Lizzeri
(1999). In these models, the certifier investigates the firm and chooses what to disclose to the buying public,
and is able to retain a substantial share of the surplus. Environmental certification is quite different. Certifiers
typically set a standard ex ante that firms must meet in order to receive the label. NGO certifiers aim to
maximize environmental benefits, and are typically close to bankruptcy. Industry-sponsored certifiers aim to
maximize the benefits to the firms being certified rather than to the certifier itself. Thus, the for-profit certifier
model does not seem appropriate for our purposes.
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to mimic a “green” firm by spending money to falsify a label; they show that this re-
duces the effectiveness of labeling. A second line of research explores the implications
of imperfect certification processes. McCluskey (2000) demonstrates the importance of
repeat purchases and third-party monitoring when certification is imperfect. Mahenc
(2009) shows that if consumers do not consider the labeling agency trustworthy, then
the agency may charge excessive prices in order to signal its credibility. Mason (2011)
shows that when certification can distinguish a green firm from a brown firm only with
a certain amount of noise, ecolabeling can either raise or lower welfare depending upon
the cost and accuracy of the certification process.
Other papers explore the interaction of ecolabels with alternatives such as govern-
ment regulation. Nimon and Beghin (1999) find that governments in the global “South”
have greater incentives to harmonize national labels than do governments in the North.
Heyes andMaxwell (2004) find that a voluntaryNGO labelmay reducewelfare byunder-
mining political support for a more socially desirable mandatory government standard;
the two instruments together, however, are better than either one alone. Greaker (2006)
shows that a government may prefer to eschew setting a domestic environmental stan-
dard, and instead introduce an ecolabel and induce both the domestic and the foreign
firm to adopt it. Hamilton and Zilberman (2006) study the relationship between market
structure, environmental policy, and the amount of fraud in markets with ecocertifi-
cation. Baksi and Bose (2007) find that costless self-labeling by individual firms often
dominates a costly third-party label, but only if the government is willing to engage in
costly monitoring of the self-labels. Ben Youssef and Lahmandi-Ayed (2008) show that
a welfare-maximizing certification body that also cares about political support may opt
not to offer a label at all. Bottega and De Freitas (2009) find that if an NGO can adver-
tise and convince consumers to pay for the environmental enhancements provided by
labeled products, the need for government regulations aimed at substandard products
may cease as that market dries up.
Few papers formally model label competition, and none of these allow standards
to be set strategically. Lerner and Tirole (2006) consider how a firm that is unsure of
the quality of its own product chooses from a continuum of nonstrategic certifiers that
vary in the stringency of their standards. Roe and Sheldon (2007) study a vertically
differentiated duopoly under a variety of government policies regarding the use of
government or private labels, assuming the government standard is exogenously set,
and the private label is always set at the firm’s profit-maximizing level. Ben Youssef and
Abderrazak (2009) study a duopoly in which each label can only be used by one firm;
under complete information adding the second ecolabel always improves environmental
protection, but if consumers cannot tell which label is more stringent, the firms use
prices to signal qualities, and the second ecolabel actually reduces overall environmental
protection. Harbaugh et al. (2011) assume firms’ qualities and the stringency of labels are
exogenous; they find that when consumers are unsure of the environmental standard
conveyed by a given ecolabel, then label competition can produce consumer confusion
that undermines the value of labeling.
Our analysis differs from previous work in several respects. Most importantly,
we model rivalry between ecolabels, with the labeling organizations choosing their
standards strategically to further their own objectives. In particular, we explore the
impact of strategic competition between anNGO label and an industry-sponsored label;
for simplicity, we limit each labeling organization to offering one standard. Our setting
includes a large number of competing firms,whose costs of environmental improvement
are unobservable to others but the distribution of which is common knowledge. We
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do not force a simple choice between “brown” and “green” production processes, but
instead allow each firm to choose exactly howgreen itwants to be.Our key finding is that
even when labels provide perfectly reliable information to consumers, environmental
damages may be worse in the presence of both labels than with the NGO label alone;
we also provide insight into the conditions under which welfare-reducing competition
is likely.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out our basic
model with a single label, and compares the NGO label to the industry label. Section 3
studies the nature of strategic interaction when the two labels coexist, and characterizes
each group’s best response to the other’s label. Section 4 characterizes the Nash equi-
librium of the game with competing labels, first analytically (for the case of a uniform
distribution of firms’ environmental improvement costs) and then using simulation re-
sults (for a Beta distribution with a range of parameter values). Section 5 analyzes the
impacts of label competition on industry profits and the environment, using simulation
methods. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2. Basic Model with Single Label
The industry consists of a continuum of firms that supply a product sold in a global
market. Each firm has an ecological footprint that can be improved, for example, it emits
pollutants that impose external costs or conducts activities that diminish habitat and
ecosystem services. Firms differ according to their costs of environmental improvement,
indexed by θ , which is distributed over [θ , θ ] with probability density f (θ ) and cumu-
lative distribution F (θ ). The distribution F (θ ) is common knowledge, but the efficiency
of any given firm is not known to other firms or consumers.3
Each firm chooses its own environmental improvement level s, the cost of which
is θs.4 In order to make the analysis more tractable, we assume that each labeling
organization offers exactly one standard, and that funding for each organization comes
from exogenous sources such as foundation grants, citizen donations, or industry trade
association dues. Although we do not model the costs of label development explicitly,
our assumption on the number of labels can be interpreted as a restriction on the fixed
costs of label development, with these costs being small enough that each organization
is willing to offer one label, but large enough that neither organization is willing to offer
more than one.
There is also a continuum of consumers, all of whom have “green” preferences.
These are captured by assuming that the representative consumer has a willingness-to-
pay p(s) with p′(s) > 0 and p′′(s) < 0. For simplicity, we will assume that p(s) is also the
price received by a firm offering a product of environmental quality level s, which can
be interpreted as assuming that individual consumers have an inelastic demand for one
unit of the good. We assume that p′(0) > θ , to ensure that at least the firm with lowest
environmental improvement cost can profitably implement a strictly positive level of
environmental improvement.
If consumers know that a firm has undertaken environmental improvement
level s, and the firm has environmental improvement cost θ , then its profits are
3. This basic structure follows that of Heyes and Maxwell (2004).
4. This cost can be thought of as having two components, a certification cost that is common to all firms
and a firm-specific cost of changing production technology. In particular, let θ = c + gφ , with φ distributed
over some range with probability density b(φ) and cumulative distribution B(φ). Then cs = sθ can be thought
of as the common certification cost, and sgφ as the firm-specific cost of changing production technology.
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π (θ , s) = p(s) − θs. However, in the absence of any labels, consumers cannot distin-
guish the environmental improvement levels of any individual firms, so a firm has no
incentive to undertake any environmental improvement, and aggregate environmental
damages are unchanged.
We begin with the situation in which firms have only one labeling option, devel-
oped by institution i (either an NGO or an industry trade association) with standard si .
That institution will certify all firms that meet or exceed this level, and allow them to
display an ecolabel to consumers. A firm of type θ will mitigate to the level required
to obtain certification if p(si ) − θsi > p(0), that is, if its costs are lower than the corre-
sponding cutoff level θ i :
θ < θ i ≡ p(s
i ) − p(0)
si
. (1)
Thus, an interval of low-cost firms will choose to be certified. Note that
∂θ i
∂si
= s
i p′(si ) − (p(si ) − p(0))
(si )2
= s
i p′(si ) − siθ i
(si )2
= p
′(si ) − θ i
si
< 0. (2)
Because thefirm’sprofit function p(s) − θs is concave in s, it has auniquemaximum
at which p′(s) − θ = 0, which we denote by s∗(θ ). By definition, for the firm at the cutoff
level, profits are zero, hence marginal profits are negative, that is, p′(si ) − θ i < 0. Thus,
as the standard becomes more stringent, fewer firms adopt the standard, because the
cutoff cost rate falls. Note that (1) implicitly imposes an upper bound on the standard
that can be imposed, namely, s defined by (p(s) − p(0))/s = θ .
2.1 NGO Label in Autarky
Suppose the NGO is on its own in developing an ecolabel. The NGO is assumed to have
as its objective the maximization of environmental improvements, V(s), which are a
function of the standard it selects.5 The NGO chooses its standard sN (and correspond-
ingly θN) to maximize V(sN) = sNF (θN). The first-order condition is
∂V(sN)
∂sN
= F (θN) + ∂θ
N
∂sN
sN f (θN) = 0,
and substituting in from (2) and rearranging implies
p′(sN) = θN − F (θ
N)
f (θN)
. (3)
The NGO faces a trade-off: increasing its standard by a small amount causes all
inframarginal firms to increase their environmental improvement, but also causes some
firms at the margin to abandon certification. The NGO continues increasing its standard
until these two opposing effects exactly balance one another. We do not present second-
order conditions, but they can be shown to hold if the price function is sufficiently
concave.
5. We assume the NGO’s valuation of environmental amenities is linear in s, while consumers have
diminishing marginal utility of quality. The fact that the NGO’s marginal valuation of environmental quality
does not diminish is meant to capture the notion that the advocacy group has an objective that is not limited
by consumers’ current willingness to pay.
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2.2 Industry Label in Autarky
Suppose now that there is no NGO label, and the industry sets its own label instead. The
industry sets a standard s I and firms decide whether or not to mitigate to a level that
complies with the standard. A firm of type θ will do so if θ < θ I , as previously defined.
The industry is assumed to have as its objective the maximization of industry
profits, so it chooses s I to maximize the total profits of certifiers and noncertifiers,
(s I ) =
∫ θ I
θ
(p(s I ) − θs I ) f (θ )dθ +
∫ θ
θ I
p(0) f (θ )dθ .
The first-order condition is
∂(s I )
∂s I
=
∫ θ I
θ
(p′(s I ) − θ ) f (θ )dθ + ∂θ
I
∂s I
(p(s I ) − θ I s I − p(0)) f (θ I ) = 0.
From the definition of θ I , we know that p(s I ) − θ I s I = p(0), so the above simplifies to
∂(s I )
∂s I
=
∫ θ I
θ
(p′(s I ) − θ ) f (θ )dθ = 0. (4)
Integrating by parts and rearranging terms allows us to rewrite the industry’s
first-order condition as
p′(s I ) = θ I −
∫ θ I
θ
F (θ )dθ
F (θ I )
, (5)
which will facilitate comparison between the industry label and the NGO label.
Industry profits clearly increase from the presence of the ecolabel, since p(s I ) −
θs I > p(0) for all firms that adopt the ecolabel. Furthermore, since industry maximizes
profits, industry profits must be at least as great as when the NGO sets the ecolabel.
2.3 Comparing Labels
Now we want to compare the degrees of stringency chosen for the two kinds of labels
in autarky; that is, when there is only one label in existence. To do so, we impose the
relativelyweak assumption that the density f (θ ) is log-concave,whichmeans the natural
logarithm of f (θ ) is concave. Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005) show that this property is
satisfied by such familiar distributions as the uniform, the normal, the exponential, the
logistic, and the Beta distributions.
Proposition 1: If f (θ ) is log-concave, then in autarky the NGO always sets a more stringent
standard than does the industry.
Proposition 1 shows that under quite general conditions the NGO will set a more
stringent standard than the industry in autarky.6 Nevertheless, while this result is very
intuitive, it does not necessarily hold for all probability distributions. Note that a public
standard, set by a government whose objective function is some weighted average of
industry profits and environmental improvement, would be set at a level in between
those chosen by the NGO and the industry.
6. We thank Mark Bagnoli for his generous help with this proposition.
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3. Combining NGO and Industry Labels
Weturnnext to the interactionbetween the twoecolabelswhen they coexist. Throughout,
we will use subscript “A” for “autarky” to denote standards when only one entity sets
a standard, and the subscript “B” to denote the case when both labels coexist. For the
moment, let us abstract from which label is stricter and simply refer to a “High” and
a “Low” standard, so that sHB > s
L
B , which implies that θ
H
B < θ
L
B (i.e., the cutoff cost
level for the higher standard is lower than for the lower standard). Now firms will sort
themselves into three categories: certifying to the High standard, the Low standard, or
none at all. We will have two conditions determining which label a firm signs up for,
and the nature of the two conditions will depend upon which label is more stringent.
A firm of type θ certifies to the High standard if doing so is more profitable than
certifying to the Low standard,7 that is, if p(sHB ) − θsHB > p(sLB ) − θsLB , or
θ < θHB ≡
p
(
sHB
) − p(sLB)
sHB − sLB
. (6)
A firm of type θ certifies to the Low standard if doing so is more profitable than not
certifying to a standard at all, that is, if p(sLB ) − θsLB > p(0), or
θ < θ LB ≡
p
(
sLB
) − p(0)
sLB
. (7)
A firm of type θ opts not to certify at all if θ > θ LB .
To analyzehowthe cutoff values respond to changes in each standard, the following
Lemma will be useful.
Lemma 1: p′
(
sLB
) − θHB > 0 > p′(sHB ) − θHB .
The lemma allows us to establish how participation in the two labels varies with
changes in their stringency. Differentiation shows that
dθHB
dsHB
= p
′(sHB ) − θHB
(sHB − sLB )
< 0, (8)
dθHB
dsLB
= − p
′(sLB) − θHB
sHB − sLB
< 0. (9)
From Lemma 1, we know that since a firm of type θHB is just indifferent between
the High and Low standards, its marginal profits at the High standard are negative, so
raising the High standard lowers its cutoff cost threshold. Furthermore, an increase in
the Low standard also lowers the cutoff cost threshold for High standard participants,
because the Low standard is now more attractive.
As in the autarky case, the cutoff cost for the Low standard is decreasing in the
stringency of that standard; it is unaffected by the High standard.
dθ LB
dsLB
= p
′(sLB) − θ LB
sLB
< 0, (10)
7. It is straightforward to show that if the High standard is more profitable than the Low standard, it is
also more profitable than not certifying at all.
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dθ LB
dsHB
= 0. (11)
Thus, tightening theHigh standard leads to reduced certification to theHigh label but has
no effect on certification to the Low label. However, tightening the Low standard lowers
both cutoff thresholds, which reduces certification overall and reduces certification to
theHigh label, but can result in either increased or reduced certification to the Low label.
We turn now to establishing how each label responds to entry by the other. We
begin with the case in which the industry responds to the standard set by the NGO, and
then turn to the opposite case. As in the vertical differentiation literature (e.g., Ronnen,
1991), we will see that the two organizations have incentives to differentiate themselves
one from the other, so that a High standard by the initial partymay elicit a Low standard
from the other, whereas a Low standard from the initial party may elicit a High standard
from the other. Throughout the analysis,wewill assume that the second-order conditions
for an interior optimum for both the NGO and the industry labels are satisfied for each
case we consider; it can be shown that concavity of the objective functions is assured if
the willingness-to-pay function is sufficiently concave.
3.1 Industry Best Response
Suppose the NGO has set a standard sN and the industry chooses a best response.
That best response may be above or below the NGO standard. Industry profits are
then the maximum of the profits associated with the best response conditional on the
industry standard being higher than the NGO standard (“BI H”) and the best response
conditional on the industry standard being lower than the NGO standard (“BI L”):
B
(
s IB ; s
N
B
) = max [BIL(s IL ; sNB ), BIH(s IH ; sNB )] ,
where
BIL
(
s IL ; s
N
B
) = max
s IB<s
N
B
∫ θNBIL
θ
(
p(sNB
) − θsNB ) f (θ )dθ +
∫ θ IBIL
θNBIL
(
p(s IL
) − θs IB) f (θ )dθ
+
∫ θ
θ IBIL
p(0) f (θ )dθ ,
and
BIH(s IH ; s
N
B ) = max
s IB>s
N
B
∫ θ IBIH
θ
(p
(
s IH
) − θs IH) f (θ )dθ +
∫ θNBIH
θ IBIH
(
p(sNB ) − θsNB
)
f (θ )dθ
+
∫ θ
θNBIH
p(0) f (θ )dθ .
We conduct the analysis by considering both the case where the industry response
is below the NGO standard, and the opposite. Although Proposition 1 suggests that the
former case is more likely to obtain, both are possible in theory and must be considered
carefully. The following proposition characterizes how the industry association adjusts
its standard in response to competition from the NGO standard.
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Proposition 2: Suppose the NGO sets a standard sNB and then industry responds with a
standard s IB. If s
I
B < s
N
B , then it must be the case that s
I
B < s
I
A, and if s
I
B > s
N
B , then it must be
the case that s IB > s
I
A.
The proposition shows that, relative to autarky, the industry responds to the pres-
ence of an NGO standard by increasing the difference between its standard and that
of the NGO. Thus, if the industry standard under label competition is weaker than the
NGO standard, then it is even weaker than it would be under autarky. By weakening
its standard, the industry association increases participation in its standard and raises
profit margins of some high-cost firms (who had previously not certified at all and now
certify to the Low standard) at the expense of medium-cost firms (who were already
willing to be certified to the Low standard and now receive a lower price). However, if
the industry standard under label competition is stricter than the NGO standard, then it
is even stronger than it would be under autarky. By tightening its standard relative to its
autarky level, the industry association raises profit margins of low-cost firms (who were
already willing to certify to the highest standard available) whereas cutting those of
somemedium-cost firms (who are driven to switch from the High to the Low standard).
In either case, the presence of a competitor drives the industry to take a more extreme
position than it would under autarky, a result reminiscent of the vertical differentiation
literature (Ronnen, 1991).
The next proposition further characterizes the industry’s best-response function.
Proposition 3: The industry’s best-response function s I (sN) is upward-sloping. There
exists an s˜N such that the industry best-response function is discontinuous at sN = s˜N, with
s I (sN) > sNfor sN < s˜N and s I (sN) < sNfor sN > s˜N.
The two foregoing propositions provide a detailed characterization of the indus-
try’s best-response function. We know it is everywhere upward-sloping, with a down-
ward jump at the point where sN = s˜N. Furthermore, we know that s I (sN) < s IA ∀s IB < sN
and s I (sN) > s IA ∀s IB > sN. For future use, define s I (˜sN) as the limit as sN approaches s˜N
from below and s I (˜sN) as the limit as sN approaches s˜N from above. Thus, the industry
best-response function jumps downward from s I (˜sN) to s I (˜sN) at s˜N. The existence of
discontinuous best-response functions means that the nature of equilibrium with com-
peting ecolabels may be quite complex. Before turning to this discussion, however, we
characterize the NGO’s best-response function.
3.2 NGO Best Response
Now suppose industry sets a standard s IB and then the NGO responds with a standard
sNB . Intuitively, the NGO can either loosen its standard relative to the autarky case, in
order to draw in more participants, or tighten it so as to achieve inframarginal improve-
ments from all the firms that would have certified to its standard anyway. We begin by
demonstrating that the NGO never wishes to set sNB = s IB . We then go on to consider its
best response in more detail.
Lemma 2: Under label competition, the NGO chooses sNB = s IB .
Lemma 2 shows that the NGO never wants to simply set a standard equal to that
of the industry label. It can always do better by raising its standard above the industry
standard. Doing sowill not cause any of the firms that had been certifying to the industry
standard to abandon certification, but it will induce some firms to switch to the more
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stringent NGO standard. Hence, total environmental improvement is greater. However,
it may be able to achieve even greater environmental improvement by setting a standard
below that of the industry standard.We consider each of these possibilities inmore detail
below. The next proposition summarizes how the NGO responds to the presence of an
industry standard.
Proposition 4: Suppose the industry sets a standard s IB and the NGO responds with a
standard sNB . Then, it is possible for s
N
B ≥ sNA but also possible for sNB < sNA .
Theproposition shows that theNGOresponds to an industry standard in a complex
fashion. The NGO loses market share when the industry introduces a standard, and the
appropriate response may either be to weaken its standard and recapture market share,
or raise the standard and get more effort out of the remaining participants. Ultimately,
whether theNGO standard is stronger or weaker under competition than under autarky
depends upon parameter values.
The following proposition further characterizes the NGO’s best-response function.
It turns out to be more complex than the industry best-response function.
Proposition 5: If f (θ ) is monotonically increasing (decreasing), then the NGO’s best-
response function slopes upward (downward). Furthermore, for any density function that is
single-peakedwithmode θm, if θ IB < θ
m (θ IB > θ
m), then the best-response function slopes upward
(downward). There is a discontinuity in the NGO’s best-response function at a point s I = s˜ I ,
with sN(s I ) > s I for s I < s˜ I and sN(s I ) < s I for s I > s˜ I .
Thus, unlike the industry’s best-response function, the NGO’s best-response func-
tion is not even guaranteed to be piecewise monotonic unless we place additional
restrictions upon f (θ ). Our simulation results in Section 4 illustrate the potential for a
nonmonotonic NGO best-response function. For future use, define sN (˜s I ) as the limit
as s I approaches s˜ I from below and sN (˜s I ) as the limit as s I approaches s˜ I from above
Thus, the NGO best-response function jumps downward from sN (˜s I ) to sN (˜s I ) at s˜ I .
4. Characterizing Nash Equilibria
The previous section showed that label competition can produce a complex set of re-
sponses from the institutions creating standards. The NGO’s best-response function is
particularly complex. The industry best-response slopes upward, but has a discontinuity
where it drops downward. Like the industry, the NGO has a discontinuity in its best-
response function, but unlike the industry, the NGO’s best-response function is only
monotonic if additional restrictions are placed on the distribution function, for example,
if the underlying density function is monotonic. These features make it extremely diffi-
cult to fully characterize the Nash equilibrium retaining our general functional forms.
For a stable equilibrium with sN > s I to exist, it must be the case that the industry
best-response function is steeper than theNGObest-response function, that is, dsN/ds I is
greater along the industry reaction function than theNGO reaction function. In addition,
the discontinuity in the industry best-response function must allow for the reaction
functions to cross, that is, s I (˜sN) < s˜ I .
A stable equilibrium with sN < s I may also exist. Such an equilibrium would
similarly require the industry response function to be steeper, as well as that the NGO
reaction function has a discontinuity point that allows for the second equilibrium, that
is, sN (˜s I ) <˜sN.
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Since further analytical manipulation with the general functional forms is unlikely
to be fruitful, we explore the Nash equilibria in the two-label game by employing addi-
tional assumptions. First,we study a commonlyuseddistribution function—theuniform
distribution—to derive more tractable analytical results and a transparent numerical so-
lution. Second, to consider a wider variety of possibilities, we conduct simulations using
a flexible Beta distribution, in combination with different cost ranges and price func-
tions of different curvatures. In these simulations,we always find the existence of a stable
equilibrium with sN > s I , and we also find some cases in which a second equilibrium
with sN < s I is possible.
4.1 Uniform Distribution
We begin our exploration of Nash equilibria by focusing on the uniform distribution.
Let p(s) = ln(1 + s) and let f (θ ) be uniform on [θ , θ ]. Thus, f (θ ) = 1/(θ − θ ) and F (θ ) =
(θ − θ )/(θ − θ). For simplicity, we will focus on the case where θ = 0.1 and θ = 1.1.8
Now the NGO’s first-order condition under autarky simplifies to p′(sN) = θ . For
p(s) = ln(1 + s), we have p′(s) = 1/(1 + s), so sN = (1 − θ )/θ , p(sN) = − ln θ , and θN =
[p(sN) − p(0)]/sN = −θ ln θ/[1 − θ ]. If θ= 0.1, then sNA = 9, p(sNA ) = 2.30259, and θNA =
0.256.
The industry’s first-order condition in autarky simplifies to p′(s IA) = (θ I + θ)/2. It
is easy to see that p′(s IA) ≥ p′(sNA ). The concavity of p(s) then implies that s IA ≤ sNA . For
p(s) = ln(1 + s), the first-order condition implies s IA = 2/(θ IA + θ ) − 1, so substituting in
for θ IA we obtain
s IA =
(2 − θ)s IA − ln(1 + s IA)
ln(1 + s IA) + s IAθ
.
There is no closed-form solution to this equality, but for θ = 0.1 the numerical solution
is s IA = 2.1624, p(s IA) = 1.1513, and θ IA = ln(3.1624)/2.1624 = 0.53243.
When the labels compete, we must consider sN > s I and sN < s I . In the first case,
the NGO’s first-order condition is the same as the autarky case, so the NGO continues to
set sN = (1 − θ )/θ . In the second case, it turns out that ∂V(sNB ; s IB)/∂sN = 0, so changes in
abatement under the NGO’s standard are exactly offset by changes in abatement under
the industry’s standard. Thus, a best response for theNGO is simply to keep its standard
at sNB = (1 − θ )/θ .
What is the industry’s standard under label competition? Consider first Case 1,
with sN > s I . The industry’s first-order condition is p′(s IB) = (θ I + θN)/2 > (θ I + θ)/2 =
p′(s IA). The concavity of p(s) implies that if s
I
B < s
N
B , then s
I
B < s
I
A. Numerical anal-
ysis shows s IB =1.5290 in Case 1. Note that this equilibrium is clearly stable, be-
cause the NGO’s reaction function is flat, whereas the industry’s reaction function is
upward-sloping. Direct calculation of the two cutoff costs shows θNB = 0.184014 and
θ IB = 0.606821, implying market shares of 42% for the industry label and 8% for the
NGO label, with half of the firms opting to be unlabeled.
8. Given this monotonically increasing price premium function and constant marginal abatement costs, in
the limit as θ→ 0 the NGO’s optimal standard goes to infinity, and the NGO relies on a single firm to costlessly
produce an unlimited amount of abatement. To avoid this outcome, we assume a minimum cost, but other
options would be to assume increasing marginal costs or to constrain abatement by an individual firm to be
no larger than an initial level of pollution. Such settings would induce the NGO to set a lower standard and
spread the burden of abatement across a larger group of firms, even when θ= 0.
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Table I.
Results for Uniform Distribution with θ ∈ [0.1, 1.1] and
p(s) = ln(1 + s)
Standard Price Share of Market (%)
NGO autarky 9.000 2.303 15.6
Industry autarky 2.162 1.151 43.2
NGO both 9.000 2.303 8.4
Industry Both 1.629 0.928 42.3
InCase 2, s IB > s
N
B . The industry’s first-order condition is now p
′(s IB) = (θ I + θ )/2 ≥
θ = p′(sNB ). Hence, the only solution has s IB < sNB , which is inconsistent with the assump-
tion that s IB > s
N
B . Thus, for the uniformdistribution there is no equilibriumwith s
I
B > s
N
B .
In summary, as shown in Table I, for the uniform distribution with a natural
logarithmic price function, theNGO in autarky sets amuchmore stringent standard than
the industry would in autarky, and achieves much greater environmental improvement.
Under label competition, the NGOmaintains the same standard as in autarky, but loses
nearly half of its participation, whereas the industry greatly relaxes its standard and
roughly maintains its market share.
4.2 Simulations with Other Cost Distributions
Our analysis thus far has yielded few general results about label competition. Our most
robust result is that in autarky the NGO sets a more stringent label than does industry.
Once the labels compete, however, many different outcomes are possible. Either label
may strengthen or weaken its standard relative to the autarky level. As a result, it is
possible that environmental damages will increase under label competition, relative to a
case where only the NGO label is offered. To shed further light on how label competition
performs, and when it is more likely to produce negative environmental results, we
conduct a series of simulation analyses.
We use a Beta distribution to conduct a wide variety of simulations, varying the
skewness and variance of the distribution function, the shape of the price premium, and
the range of costs.We employ a logarithmic price function of the form p(s) = h ln(1 + js),
which results in a marginal price premium of p′(s) = hj/(1 + js). By varying h and
j , we change the curvature of the price function. We consider three different price
functions: a “regular” price function p(s) = ln(1 + s), a “bowed” price function p(s) =
0.5 ln(1 + 10s), and a “flat” price function p(s) = 2 ln(1 + s/4).
We assume the environmental improvement cost parameter θ = (c + gφ), where
φ is distributed over [0, 1] with probability density f (φ) and cumulative distribution
F (φ). A common cost term is assumed to be nonnegative (c ≥ 0), and forms the lower
bound θ . The width of the distribution is determined by g. Thus, firm environmental
improvement costs fall in the range [c, c + g]. For the density function f (φ), we use the
Beta distribution, which is defined as
f (φ; a , b) = φ
a−1(1 − φ)b−1∫ 1
0 u
a−1(1 − u)b−1du
= (a + b)
(a )(b)
φa−1(1 − φ)b−1,
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FIGURE 1. REACTION FUNCTION EXAMPLES (NARROW, SYMMETRIC DISTRIBU-
TION)
where (u) is the gamma function.9 The Beta distribution is defined on the interval [0, 1],
hasmean E(φ) = a/(a + b), and is log-concave if a ≥ 1 and b ≥ 1 (Bagnoli andBergstrom
2005). The Beta distribution is convenient because it can take on a great variety of shapes
depending upon the values of a and b. For example, if a = b, the density is unimodal
with mean 1/2, and if in addition a = b = 1, we have the uniform distribution. When
a > b, the density skews to the left (i.e., more of the tail is at the low-cost end), while if
a < b, the density skews to the right (with more of the tail toward the high-cost end).
Figure 1 displays three examples of reaction functions, generated using the three
different price functions with the same cost distribution (a = b = 5, which is narrow
and symmetric, with c = 0, g = 1, meaning the cost distribution is identical to the Beta
distribution). As discussed in the previous section, in all cases the industry response
rises from its autarky point until sN reaches s˜N, at which point it jumps below the 90◦
line and begins to rise again with the NGO standard, asymptoting back to the autarky
level. The NGO reaction function also has a jump point, and in all cases we find that
s˜ I > s IA. However, the shape of the NGO reaction function, and whether it crosses the
industry function below the 90◦ line, depends on our parameter assumptions.
Figure 1(a) (using the “regular” price function) shows an example in which the
NGO response rises monotonically with s I until the jump point is reached, but here
sN (˜s I ) > s˜N, so there is a single Nash equilibrium in which the NGO tightens and
industry loosens in response to label competition. Figure 1(b) (using the “bowed” price
function) shows an example in which the NGO response initially declines with s I before
rising again until the jump point is reached, also beyond the industry jump point; again
there is a single Nash equilibrium, but in this case the NGO has loosened in response to
label competition. Figure 1(c) (using the “flat” price function) shows the NGO response
rising monotonically with s I until the jump point is reached, but this time sN (˜s I ) < s˜N,
and a second Nash equilibrium is possible in which the industry offers the higher
standard (but not as high as the NGO’s in the first Nash equilibrium), whereas the
NGO has a lower standard (though not as low as the industry offers in the first Nash
equilibrium). Indeed, both equilibria are stable, with the industry response function
crossing from below. Furthermore, if we calculate the values of the objective functions,
we find in this case the NGO would prefer the BI L equilibrium, whereas the industry
prefers the BI H equilibrium.
9. There is no closed-form representation for the Beta distribution.
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More generally, these three classes of equilibria (single equilibrium in which the
NGO tightens its standard relative to autarky; single equilibrium in which the NGO
loosens its standard; and multiple equilibria, one with the NGO standard higher than
the industry standard and one with the NGO standard lower) can also be generated
with the “regular” price function by varying the cost distribution; while the precise
levels change, the basic shapes are the same. In all cases, we find the presence of a stable
BI L equilibrium. In some cases, a BI H equilibrium is also possible, and sometimes
the NGO may even prefer it, but in those cases the industry would prefer the BI L
equilibrium. Thus, we do not see a necessary dominance of one equilibrium over the
other; which equilibrium is arrived at may depend on starting points or which player is
given the first move. Nevertheless, in the remainder of the paper we focus primarily on
BI L equilibria, since we know of no examples of BI H equilibria in practice.
In the next set of figures, we explore some of the underlying drivers of these
responses, but restricting ourselves to the BI L equilibria. The panels of Figure 2 show the
cutoff costs and cumulative participation in each label. The darkest shade represents the
participation in the NGO label under label competition. The medium shade represents
additional participation in the NGO label under autarky that is lost to the industry
under competition. The lighter shade represents additional participation garnered under
competition relative to the NGO in autarky; the light and medium shades together thus
represent total participation in the industry label when the two standards compete.
Finally, the black line represents the cutoff cost level for participation in the industry
label in autarky.
In Figure 2(a), the price premium takes the “regular” form, and we notice that the
industry autarky cutoff is well past the mode of the distribution at 84% participation,
whereas the NGO autarky cutoff is right by the mode at 53% participation. With label
competition, the industry loosens its standard and expands total participation above the
autarky standards, and takes two-thirds of the market share from the NGO standard
(which we know is also higher from Figure 2 a). Figure 2(b) shows the results with the
bowed price function, which offers a higher premium at lower standards. In combi-
nation with the assumed distribution, the industry always garners 100% participation.
Meanwhile, the NGO in autarky has a cutoff cost well past the peak in the distribution;
since f ′(θ ) < 0 at this point, we know that the NGO best-response function is initially
downward sloping, so it loosens in response to label competition. Despite this easing,
it still loses the bulk of its autarky market share to the industry, going from 80% to
20% participation. Figure 2(c) shows the case of the flat price premium; in this case,
the labels are competing in a smaller range at the low end of the distribution, all to
the left of the mode of the distribution. Since f ′(θ ) > 0, we know the NGO tightens its
standard in response to label competition; its market share falls from 16% in autarky to
5%. Meanwhile, the loosening of the industry standard causes the cutoff value to ride
up the increasing portion of the distribution, with a net effect of increasing its market
share slightly relative to autarky (from 23% to 24%).
In Section 5, we discuss how these changes in the standards and participation rates
with label competition affect the objectives of the two sponsors.
5. Impacts of Label Competition
It seems unlikely that industry would set a standard higher than that of the NGO, given
that its autarky standard is lower and its response to an NGO standard is typically
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to further loosen its own standard. This presumption is supported in the numerical
analysis, which always finds an equilibrium with the NGO standard higher than the
industry standard; even in the cases where a second, “reverse,” equilibrium may also
exist, we have never found it to dominate for both parties. Therefore, we focus on cases
in which sNB > s
I
B .
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5.1 Profits
By definition, the addition of an industry-chosen label to a market with an NGO label
must weakly raise profits. After all, industry could always set its standard equal to the
NGO standard and maintain profits at the same level; any other choice must increase
profits. The question is, how do profits compare to the situation in which the industry
chooses the sole label? This is the subject of the next proposition.
Proposition 6: Industry profits are higher when an industry label and an NGO label coexist
than when there exists only the industry label.
From the industry perspective, label competition is always a good thing. Industry
can maintain the same standard it offered under autarky, and the NGO standard simply
offers another option that is more profitable for low-cost firms. Alternatively, industry
can adjust its standard somewhat if that would be even more profitable. Thus, having
an NGO standard alongside the industry standard always raises profits.
5.2 Environment
It is easy to compare environmental improvements between the autarky systems; obvi-
ously, since the NGO maximizes environmental improvement, emissions will be lower
with an NGO label than with an industry label. However, what happens to environ-
mental improvement when the industry introduces its own label alongside the NGO
label?
Suppose that θNB < θ
N
A < θ
I
B (this does not require that s
N
B ≥ sNA , but only that the
NGO does not gain market share when the competing label enters). The change in
environmental benefits can be decomposed into three parts:
V
(
sNB ; s
I
B
) − V(sNA ; 0)
=
∫ θNB
θ
sNB f (θ )dθ +
∫ θ IB
θNB
s IB f (θ )dθ −
∫ θNA
θ
sNA f (θ )dθ
= (sNB − sNA )F (θNB )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Change in Stringency
?
(
s IB − sNA
) (
F (θNA ) − F
(
θNB
))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Lost Participation to Industry
−
+ s IB
(
F
(
θ IB
) − F (θNA ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Additional Participation
+
.
Thus, the change in environmental improvement depends upon whether
the changes in reductions among NGO label participants, plus the lost reductions from
those firmswho switch from theNGO label to the industry one, outweigh the additional
reductions from former nonadopters who now adopt the industry standard.
Note that if sNB < s
N
A , then the first term is negative; when the NGO responds to
competition by loosening its standard, overall environmental benefitsmaywell be lower
than with the NGO in autarky.
5.2.1 Uniform Distribution
With our example of the uniformdistribution,we have already shown that sNB = sNA > s IB ,
and it can be shown that the change in damages is
V(sNA ; s
I
B) − V
(
sNA ; 0
) = f (sNA (θNA − θNB ) − s IB(θ IB − θNB )) = 0. (12)
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FIGURE 3. ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS UNDER AUTARKY AND LABEL COMPE-
TITION, BY PRICE PREMIUM (FOR NARROW, SYMMETRIC DISTRIBUTION)
Thus, in this particular case, adding the industry label to the NGO label does
exactly as much good as harm, in terms of environmental benefits. This gives us the
following proposition.
Proposition 7: With a uniform distribution on costs, adding an industry label to an existing
NGO label has no effect on environmental damages.
5.2.2 Other Distribution Functions
For a wider range of distribution functions and price premia, environmental benefits
may be higher or lowerwith label competition thanwith a single NGO label.We observe
both of these outcomes in Figure 3, which displays the changes in environmental bene-
fits for our earlier examples in Figure 2 (“VIA” indicates environmental benefits under
industry autarky, “VNA” indicates environmental benefits under NGO autarky, and
“VB” indicates environmental benefits when both labels are present.) As expected, ben-
efits are always lowest under the industry autarky standard. Relative to NGO autarky,
label competition increases benefits when the price premium is flat, whereas it decreases
benefits for the other two cases. In particular, benefits are high under a single NGO label
when the price premium is bowed, and they fall dramatically in label competition, due
to the combination of loosening of the NGO standard and a large loss in market share.
We also conducted simulations for the other distribution functions using the regu-
lar price premium, but they are qualitatively similar to our results in Figure 3, so we do
not present them in detail here. As expected, we found that VIA < V
N
A in all cases. More
interestingly, VB < VNA for distributions with (a = 5, b = 5) and (a = 2, b = 5), that is,
competitionwas environmentally harmful for narrowdistributions thatwere symmetric
or skewed toward high costs. Competition was only beneficial for narrow distributions
skewed toward low costs.
5.3 Broader Simulation Results
We conducted extensive simulations assuming different combinations of the three forms
of the log price function, Beta distribution functions, and cost ranges for θ . Although we
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Table II.
Summary of Simulation Results: Responses to Label
Competition Compared to Autarky
Industry response Loosen
Total participation Higher
Industry profits Higher
NGO market share Lower
NGO response Tighten Loosen
Environmental benefits Higher Lower Lower
Industry market share Higher Lower Lower Lower
Reverse equilibrium Possible Not Found Not Found Not Found
do not claim these simulations are exhaustive (or randomly generated), we selected a
wide variety to investigate a range of effects. In terms of the reaction functions and effects
of label competition on objectives, the results can be sorted into categories illustrated in
Table II.
In all cases, the industry responds to competition by loosening its standard, and
label competition increases industry profits and overall participation (sometimes up to
100%). The NGO may tighten or loosen its standard in response. Whenever the NGO
does respond by loosening its standard, environmental benefits are always lower under
competition than NGO autarky. However, when the NGO responds by tightening the
standard, environmental benefits are not always higher than under autarky. Interest-
ingly, we only observe the presence of a BI H Nash equilibrium in situations in which
participation in the industry standard is higher than under its autarky standard, which
also coincides with environmental benefits being higher with label competition.
Our broad conclusion from the simulations is that the outcome of label competition
is very sensitive to shifts in the distribution of firm costs, relative to the price premium.
In terms of environmental performance, there are three important dimensions: the shape
of the price premium, the variance of the distribution, and whether it is skewed to the
left or the right. With narrow distributions, label competition tends to be less valuable
for the environment, as the two labels are competing for the same set of firms, which
tends to drive down standards.When the distribution is skewed toward high-cost firms,
a single NGO label can capture most of the environmental benefits of certification, and
competition from a second label serves mainly to drive down standards and reduce
environmental performance.When the distribution is skewed toward low-cost firms, the
NGO label in autarky faces a difficult trade-off between maintaining a strict standard,
and attracting few participants, or loosening standards to increase participation. As a
result, the presence of a second label can reduce this tension by providing a chance
for higher cost firms to participate without undermining the performance of low-cost
firms.When the distribution is narrow but symmetric, there is again intense competition
between the labels, and standards are driven down by competition.
These conclusions suggest that the dynamic process of evolution in the ecolabel
business will be important but complex. As mentioned in Section 1, there has been a
proliferation of labels in recent years. A plausible dynamic trajectory might start with an
industry in which only a few specialty firms have developed a competitive advantage in
cutting their environmental improvement costs; this would imply a distribution where
firms’ costs are skewed to the left. Label competition in the early stages of labeling
may then be beneficial to the environment. As the high-cost firms learn how to reduce
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environmental improvement costs, the distribution is likely to become narrower and
more symmetric. At this point, label competition is more likely to be bad for the envi-
ronment. As cost-reducing innovations continue to diffuse through the industry, there
will eventually be a large group of firms in an industry that have invested and reduced
their environmental improvement costs, and a smaller set of laggard firms whose costs
remain stubbornly high. The distribution will then be skewed to the right, and label
competition will be detrimental for the environment. Thus, label competition may be
useful in the early stages of an industry, but consolidation of labels over time may serve
to improve the industry’s environmental performance.10
6. Conclusions
We have presented a formal economic model of rivalry between ecolabels strategically
developed by an environmental NGO and by an industry association. We showed that
an NGO label is more stringent than an industry ecolabel, assuming only one label is
present in the market at a time. When an NGO label is added to a market with an
industry label, industry profits increase. Since the NGO only enters the market if it can
reduce damages, environmental quality necessarily improves relative to the industry
label alone. However, when an industry label is added to a market with an NGO label,
the NGO may strengthen or weaken its label. Furthermore, environmental damages
may rise or fall with two labels, relative to a situation with the NGO label by itself. These
latter results are sensitive both to the distribution of environmental improvement costs
among firms and to consumers’ willingness to pay for increasingly stringent standards.
However, simulation results indicate that label competition ismore likely to be beneficial
if the respective labels are targeting separate markets (as would occur if the distribution
is wide), while a single NGO label provides greater benefits when that label would
achieve broad, industry-wide coverage (as would occur with a narrow distribution of
costs).
Our findings are testable, but to do so would require a substantial database on
labels. An empirical analysis could use information on the size distribution of firms in a
given industry as a proxy for the distribution of costs. It would also need to attempt to
assess both demand-side effects onmarket share as the number of labels changes, aswell
as supply-side effects regarding the extent of process change induced by various labels.
As Blackman and Rivera (2011) indicate, the knowledge base on ecolabels is currently
too small to draw firm conclusions about how differences in industry structure affect
ecolabel performance.
The broad policy lesson from our work is that governments cannot simply rely
on the invisible hand to guide the market for ecolabels, even when the labels are reli-
able and perfectly understood by consumers. In some cases, industry-sponsored labels
improve environmental performance relative to the case of a single ecolabel. In these
cases, welfare is necessarily higher with label competition. In other cases, environmental
protection would be enhanced if the government could stop industry-sponsored labels
from entering the marketplace. However, given that profits are always higher with
multiple labels, welfare maximization might allow some competition that reduces envi-
ronmental benefits. Thus, providing general guidance regardingwhen label competition
is beneficial is challenging. Policymakers must have a sophisticated understanding of
10. Cashore (2002) offers a political science framework for future research on the evolution of certification
systems.
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demand-side information, market structure, and sustainable production processes in
order to make astute calls that improve market performance. The U.S. Federal Trade
Commission’s recently revised Green Guides offer some hope that government is devel-
oping the capacity to make more sophisticated judgment calls regarding ecolabels and
corporate green claims.11
Several simplifications in this analysis merit exploration in further research. We
have assumed that consumer willingness to pay for one label depends only on the
standard for that label; in reality, ecolabels may function as substitutes, meaning prices
would depend on the qualities of the other labels as well. Adding this feature would
create additional interactions between competing labeling schemes. It would also be
interesting to allow the NGO to campaign against the industry label, thereby reducing
the demand for the latter. We assume firms are not initially differentiated according to
their environmental quality, that there is no exit or entry in the model, and no market
power. Each labeling organization finds it too costly to offermore than one standard, and
neither is offered by a government, whose objectives might differ from both the NGO’s
and the industry’s. Extending the model to generalize these features would make our
analysis more general. Exploring the possibility of a sequential move game, where the
NGO (or the industry) sets a standard before the rival does,would also be interesting.We
have also assumed that standards set targets for reductions in damages. Although this
assumptionmaybe applicable for somevoluntary programs,many environmental labels
set absolute standards, in which case the labeling groups would face more complicated
twin distributions of firms by costs and by emissions. We would expect that including
these additional complications would tend to reinforce ambiguity in the environmental
effectiveness of competing ecolabels. Finally, we have limited ourselves to the study of
“binary” ecolabels, that is, labels that either approve or disapprove a product. Although
this is certainly true for many labels, such as Nordic Swan, Energy Star, and the Marine
Stewardship Council, there are other labels, such as LEED that have multiple tiers.
Incorporating competing multitiered labels would make an interesting extension of our
analysis.
Appendix: Proofs of Lemmas and Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1
From the two first-order conditions (3) and (5), sN > s I if at s I , p′(s I ) − θ I + F (θ I )f (θ I ) > 0,
which means the NGO prefers to increase s. This implies that
F (θ I )
f (θ I )
>
∫ θ I
θ
F (θ )dθ
F (θ I )
.
Rearranging terms, this is equivalent to
(
F (θ I )
)2
> f (θ I )
∫ θ I
θ
F (θ )dθ . (A1)
11. The new Green Guides can be accessed at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/grnrule/guides980427.htm.
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Now define
G(x) =
∫ x
θ
F (θ )dθ ,
so that G ′(x) = F (x) and G ′′(x) = f (x) for any x in the support of the random variable
θ . Given this, we can rewrite (A1) as
G ′′(x)G(x) − (G ′(x))2 < 0. (A2)
remark 3 in the appendix of Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005) shows that G(x) is log-
concave if and only if (A2) holds. Furthermore, Theorem 1 of Bagnoli and Bergstrom
(2004) establishes that log-concavity is inherited, that is, if f (x) is log-concave, then
so are F (x) and G(x). Hence, because f (x) is log-concave, so is G(x), which implies
immediately that (A2) holds. 
Proof of Lemma 1
Because the firm profit function p(s) − θs is strictly concave, it has a unique maximum,
which we denote by s∗(θ ). Hence, the existence of a cutoff cost value θHB such that
p(sHB ) − θHB sHB = p(sLB ) − θHB sLB implies that sLB < s∗(θHB ) < sHB . 
Proof of Proposition 2
There are two cases to consider. In Case 1, industry chooses a weaker standard than the
NGO, so that s IBIL < s
N
BIL, then θ
I
BIL > θ
N
BIL. At the cutoff cost factor θ
I
BIL, the alternative to
the industry label is still no label, so θ IBIL ≡ (p(s IB) − p(0))/s IB as before. The first-order
condition is now
∂BIL
∂s IB
=
∫ θ IBIL
θNBIL
(
p′
(
s IB
) − θ) f (θ )dθ = 0.
Note that this has the same form as (4) except that the lower limit of the integral is now
θNBIL instead of θ . If we evaluate the above condition at the autarky standard, so θ
I
BIL = θ IA,
we see that:
∂BIL
∂s IB
=
∫ θ IBIL
θNBIL
(
p′
(
s IA
) − θ) f (θ )dθ < ∫ θ IA
θ
(
p′
(
s IA
) − θ) f (θ )dθ = 0.
Since the move from θ to θNBIL truncates the lower end of the cost distribution, it removes
positive contributions to the integral, and hence reduces its value. Thus, marginal in-
dustry profits are negative at the autarky standard, because the existence of the NGO
label causes some low-cost firms to switch to it. Since industry profits are concave in s I ,
then in response the industry chooses a lower standard than it would in the absence of
an NGO label. In Case 2, industry chooses a standard s IB > s
N
B (and hence θ
I
BIH < θ
N
BIH),
and industry profits are

(
s IB ; s
N
B
)=∫ θ IBIH
θ
(
p(s IB
) − θs IB) f (θ )dθ +
∫ θNBIH
θ IBIH
(
p
(
sNB
) − θsNB ) f (θ )dθ +
∫ θ
θNBIH
p(0) f (θ )dθ .
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Recall that ∂θHB /∂s
L
B < 0, which in this case means that ∂θ
I
BIH/∂s
N
B < 0. If s
N = 0, then we
would have θ IB = θ IA, the autarky level. Now, however, we have sN > 0, so θ IBIH < θ IA for
any given levels of sN and s I > sN. The industry’s first-order condition is now
∂
∂s IB
=
∫ θ IBIH
θ
(
p′
(
s IB
) − θ) f (θ )dθ = 0.
This condition has exactly the same form as (4), so at first glance it appears as if industry
wants to set the same standard as in the absence of the NGO standard. However, since
θ IBIH < θ
I
A, marginal profits are higher than they would be in autarky; therefore, the
industry will choose a stronger standard than in the absence of an NGO label. 
Proof of Proposition 2
We consider the two cases in turn. Consider first Case 1, with s IB < s
N
B . Totally differen-
tiating the first-order condition, recalling that ∂θ IB/∂s
N = 0 for this case, substituting in
for ∂θNB /∂s
N = [p′(sNB ) − θNB ]/[sNB − s IB], rearranging terms, and using Lemma 1 yields
ds I
dsN
=
−︷ ︸︸ ︷
[p′(sNB ) − θNBIL]
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
[p′(s IB) − θNBIL]
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
f (θNBIL)
(sNB − s IB)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
[SOC IBIL]︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
> 0.
Hence, the best-response function is upward-sloping for Case 1. Consider next Case 2,
with s IB > s
N
B . Applying virtually identical steps to those used in Case 1, we obtain
ds I
dsN
=
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
[p′(sNB ) − θ IBIH]
−︷ ︸︸ ︷
[p′(s IB) − θ IBIH]
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
f (θ IBIH)
(s IB − sNB )︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
[SOC IBIH]︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
> 0.
Thus, regardless of whether sNB ≶ s IB , the industry’s best-response function is upward-
sloping. Finally, consider the continuity of the best-response function. From Proposition
2, we know that if s IB < s
N
B , then s
I
B < s
I
A, and if s
I
B > s
N
B , then s
I
B > s
I
A. Since the reaction
function is everywhere upward-sloping, theremust be a discontinuous jumpdownward
in the industry reaction function at some s˜N. At s˜N, it must be the case that maximized
industry profits are equal in Cases 1 and 2. 
Proof of Lemma 1
Suppose to the contrary that sNB = s IB . The level of environmental improvement achieved
is V(s IB ; s
I
B) = s IB F (θ IB). Alternatively, if the NGO sets sNB > s IB , its objective function is
VBIL
(
sNB ; s
I
B
) = s IB F (θ IBIL) + (sNB − s IB)F (θNBIL).
From (11), we know this change has no effect on θ IBIL = θ IB , so the first term on the
right-hand side is unchanged. However, some low-cost firms elect to certify to the NGO
standard, and hence the second term on the right-hand side is strictly positive. Thus
VBIL
(
sNB ; s
I
)
> V(s I ; s I ). 
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Proof of Proposition 3
In Case 1, the NGO chooses sNB > s
I and θ IBIL > θ
N
BIL. Now the relevant comparison for
the cutoff firm at θNBIL is not being unlabeled, but rather adopting the lower industry
standard. By the same logic as in the industry case, we can show that θNBIL < θ
N
A . In
other words, by offering another option besides no label, the industry label reduces
participation in the NGO label and lowers the relevant threshold cost for adopting the
NGO label. The NGO’s objective function is now
VBIL
(
sNB ; s
I
B
) = s IB F (θ IBIL) + (sNB − s IB)F (θNBIL),
and the first-order condition is
∂VBIL
∂sNB
= F (θNBIL) + (sNB − s IB) f (θNBIL)dθNBILdsNB = F
(
θNBIL
) + (p′(sNB ) − θNBIL) f (θNBIL),
where we have made use of the fact that when the industry is the Low standard,
dθ IBIL/ds
N
B = 0. Thus, once again we appear to recover the same first-order condition as
in autarky
p′
(
sNB
) = θNBIL − F
(
θNBIL
)
f
(
θNBIL
) .
However, recall that θNBIL < θ
N
A for a given s
N. This has a direct effect of reducing the
first term on the right-hand side of this equation, but it also reduces the cumulative
distribution and has an ambiguous impact on the density. Therefore, the NGO may
respond to the industry standard by either tightening or loosening its standard, or not
at all, depending on the relative size of these factors. Now consider Case 2, in which the
industry sets a standard, and the NGO responds with a lower one such that sNB < s
I
B and
θ IBIH < θ
N
BIH. In this case, the NGO maximizes
VBIH
(
sNB ; s
I
B
) = s IB F (θ IBIH) + sNB (F (θNBIH) − F (θ IBIH)) ,
leading to the first-order condition
∂VBIH
∂sNB
= F (θNBIH) − F (θ IBIH) + (s IB − sNB ) f (θ IBIH)dθ IBIHdsNB + sNB f
(
θNBIH
)dθNBIH
dsNB
= 0.
Substituting in for dθ IBIH/ds
N
B and rearranging terms, we get
p′
(
sNB
) = θNBIH − F
(
θNBIH
) − F (θ IBIH) + f (θ IBIH)(θ IBIH − θNBIH)(
f
(
θNBIH
) − f (θ IBIH)) .
The numerator of the second term on the right-hand side is smaller than in the case of
autarky (and possibly negative), but so is the denominator. Thus, the NGOmay respond
to a higher industry standard by raising or lowering its standard, relative to autarky. It
is also possible that sNB = sNA , which is easily demonstrated by considering the case of a
uniform distribution, for which the NGO’s best-response function is independent of s I .
Since the uniform distribution is analyzed in detail in Section 4, we omit that analysis
here. 
Competing Environmental Labels 715
Proof of Proposition 5
Consider first Case 1, with s IB < s
N
B . Totally differentiating the first-order condition,
substituting in for ∂θNB /∂s
I = −[p′(s IB) − θNB ]/[sNB − s IB], rearranging terms, and recalling
Lemma 1, we see that
dsN
ds I
=
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
[p′
(
s IB
) − θNB ]
−︷ ︸︸ ︷
[p′
(
sNB
) − θNB ]
?︷ ︸︸ ︷
f ′
(
θNB
)
(
sNB − s IB
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
[SOC]︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
.
Consider next Case 2, with sNB < s
I
B . Totally differentiating the first-order condition, sub-
stituting in for ∂θ IB/∂s
I = [p′(s IB) − θ IB]/[s IB − sNB ] and ∂θNB /∂s I = 0, rearranging terms,
and applying Lemma 1 yields
dsN
ds I
=
−︷ ︸︸ ︷
[p′
(
s IB
) − θ IB]
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
[p′
(
sNB
) − θ IB]
?︷ ︸︸ ︷
f ′
(
θ IB
)
(
s IB − sNB
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
[SOCNBIL]︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
.
In both cases, the sign of the best-response function depends on the shape of the
density function f (θ ). If f ′(θ ) < (>)0 for all θ , then the NGO’s best response is
downward(upward)-sloping for sNB < s
I
B . Also, for any unimodal density function
with mode θm, if θ IB < θ
m (θ IB > θ
m), then the best-response function slopes upward
(downward). Now consider the continuity of the best-response function. By construc-
tion, sN(0) = sNA . Furthermore, sN(s + ε) = sNA , since a standard of s + ε attracts no
participation. This implies a nonmonotonic best-response function. Hence, if f (θ ) is
monotonic, then there must be a jump in the best-response function at some s˜ I . How-
ever, even if f (θ ) is not monotonic, Lemma 2 shows that sN(s I ) = s I , so there must be a
discontinuity at the 45◦ line. Furthermore, the NGO best-response function must cross
the 45◦ line, since for low enough s I , for example, s I = 0, the NGO prefers to set sNA > 0
and for high enough s I , for example, s I = s, the NGO will prefer to set sN < s I since
otherwise its standard has no impact on environmental improvement. Thus, there must
be a discontinuity at sN = s I . 
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